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A
mAbstract
Literature on the immigrant labour market mismatch has not explored the signal
provided by the quality of home country work experience, particularly that of
education-occupation mismatch prior to migration.We show that type of work
experience in the home country plays a significant role in explaining immigrant mismatch
in the destination country’s labour market. We use the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
to Australia and find that having been over-educated in the last job held in the home
country increases the likelihood of being over-educated in Australia by about 45 percent.
Whereas having been under-educated in the home country has an even stronger impact,
as it increases the probability to be similarly mismatched in Australia by 62 percent.
Keywords: Immigration, Education-occupation mismatch, Sample selection
JEL classification: C34, J24, J61
1. Introduction
Most of the existing literature in labour economics has argued that education is the key sig-
nal employers’ use in determining the level of ability/productivity about those they are likely
to employ. However, there is an argument that as the number of working years increases
the strength of the education signal diminishes. For instance, Belman and Heywood (1997)
has shown that “the returns to education signals will attenuate with workforce experience”
as the skills used and/or developed in previous jobs become more important in determin-
ing the real productivity level of potential employees 1. Skills gained through professional
experience might be from jobs that do not match the individual’s education level and, thus,
might affect future job prospects in a diverging way. For example, having accumulated ex-
perience and skills below the education level may result in a lower probability of getting job
offers that match the formal educational qualifications. Conversely, having advanced in a
previous job to a position involving more knowledge and skills than the ones matching for-
mal education may result in getting subsequent offers for jobs that require a relatively
higher education level as well 2.
Recent research on immigrants’ over/under-education has typically focused only on the
formal education qualifications of migrants and has compared the possible labour market
mismatch of immigrants or ethnic minorities (i.e., second/third generation migrants) with
natives. There is an almost universal consensus in the literature that immigrants are more
often over-educated than their native counterparts and researchers forward different, and
very plausible, arguments for this disparity. These range from imperfect international2012 Piracha et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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bination of language and country of origin effect (Chiswick and Miller 2009; Green et al.
2007).
However, the extant literature on the labour market mismatch of immigrants
does not appear to have explored the possible impact of home country work ex-
perience signal, particularly the existence of education-occupation mismatch prior
to migration. We attempt to fill this gap by including the role of home country
over-/under-education as an additional determinant of immigrants’ over-/under-
education in the host country’s labour market. In other words, we want to explore
the possible role of the home country’s labour market signal on the incidence of
mismatch in the host country. Our main hypothesis is that the imperfect transfer-
ability of human capital or discrimination in the host country does not exhaust the
possible explanations for an immigrant’s mismatch: we explicitly test for the possi-
bility that the last job held prior to migration is a strong signal of a migrants’ abil-
ity for a host country’s employer. This analysis, therefore, will provide some
evidence towards the role of the level of skills accumulated in previous jobs in the
home country (i.e., below or above the education level) in explaining the incidence
of subsequent mismatch in the host country, instead of, or in addition to those
typically inferred to in the existing literature.
The significance of the human capital mismatch as an economic problem arises
from its link with productivity and, in turn, its consequence on domestic wage in-
equality. Mismatched workers do not use efficiently their competences. This ineffi-
ciency is costly to the individuals involved, as they do not receive a salary
commensurate with their abilities. It is also costly to society, as it does not make
an efficient use of the finite stock of human capital available to it. In the case of
over-education the cost is compounded by the fact that education is publicly subsi-
dized; hence there is also wastage of public resources that could have been used
otherwise. In the case of under-education, the cost is the lost opportunity, in terms
of future potential output, of not giving enough formal education (or setting ad-
equate incentives for doing so) to otherwise capable people. Within the over-/
under-education literature, a line of research has consistently found that immi-
grants are significantly more over-/under-educated than comparable natives. The
higher and persistent incidence of mismatch amongst immigrants is a potential
problem for countries where foreigners form a substantial part of the labour force
and where employment growth is mainly driven by immigration, as in Australia.
Migration policy may in fact involuntarily contribute to destabilise, and not only
expand, the domestic supply of skills by selecting people with a higher propensity
to become mismatched. In such circumstances, understanding whether the source
of such mismatch is attributable to institutional factors of the home or host coun-
tries is essential to identify which policy tools can be used to alleviate this prob-
lem. If this arises from an inefficient domestic labour market, then the host
country may be able to improve the outcome of new immigrants through better
coordination between immigration and labour market policies. This would however
be void if the source of the mismatch occurs pre-migration. In that case, the host
country may decide to revisit the criteria applied by an ineffective selection
mechanism.
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to Australia (LSIA), which contains detailed information about immigrants’ education
level, their occupation in Australia since arrival as well as their occupation in the home
country in the 12 months prior to migration. Australia has a selective immigration pol-
icy, favouring immigrants who are young, highly educated and with prior work experi-
ence that is likely to be immediately transferable to the Australian labour market. Still,
several studies have shown that immigrants are often employed below their education level
and argued that immigrants’ skills are not fully utilised in the Australian labour market (see
for example Green et al. 2007). Our paper complements these studies in a specific way.
Unlike the existing literature, our focus is not the comparison of immigrants’ and natives’
incidence of over-education, but the role of the signal from work experience in the home
labour market in determining the labour mismatch in the host country.
Our results show that immigrants’ education-occupation mismatch in the host coun-
try is, to a large extent, explained by their mismatch at home. The inclusion of dum-
mies for the education-occupation mismatch in the home country along with
covariates typically used in previous studies almost doubles the explanatory power of a
probit model for over-education and almost quadruples that for under-education. Fur-
thermore, after correcting for the sample selection bias into employment, we find that
having been over-educated in the last job held in the home country increases the prob-
ability of being over-educated at five months after immigration by 45 percent. Similarly,
having been under-educated in the home country increases the likelihood of under-
education in Australia by about 61 percent.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature
and outlines theoretical motivations while Section 3 presents the data. The empirical
model used in the paper is presented in Section 4 and the discussion of results appears
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Previous literature and theoretical motivations
We carry out our analysis within the framework of the existing over- and under-
education literature 3. This literature typically proposes that there is a reference level of
education that is required for a particular job, and when a worker is hired with an edu-
cation level that diverges from the required level, a mismatch occurs 4. This could be a
level higher than needed for the job, in which case the worker is over-educated, or
lower than the required level, in which case the worker is under-educated 5.
These models have been extended to consider the mismatch of immigrants compared to
those of natives 6. All studies show that immigrants are much more likely to be mismatched
(generally over-educated) than their native counterparts. There are several arguments put
forward for that. For instance, Chiswick and Miller (2008); 2009, for analyses of Australia
and the US, argue that the main reason for immigrant education mismatch is the less than
perfect human capital transferability across borders, especially for those who migrate from
less developed countries and/or those who have low host country language skills. Similarly,
Green et al. (2007) use the LSIA to show that immigrants in Australia are much more likely
to be over-educated than the natives and the difference is more pronounced for those com-
ing from non-English speaking backgrounds. One other explanation put forward by Battu
and Sloane (2004) is the possible discrimination against non-whites in the UK labour
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They argue that ethnic minorities possibly find it difficult to acquire jobs and therefore are
likely to work in an occupation that is not fully commensurate with their qualification.
Hence, on average more non-whites end up being over-educated. In other words, one can
argue that to be able to send a stronger signal of ability, immigrants acquire more educa-
tion, compared to natives, for the same job. Finally, some unobservable factors like motiv-
ation and innate abilities might be the reasons behind the results obtained in all studies
analysing the labour market mismatch for immigrants (see Chiswick and Miller 2009).
Education-occupation mismatch is a dynamic process that is theorised to be affected
by the individual’s experience in the labour market. For example, the search-and-match
theory hypothesises that mismatch originates from imperfect information about the
labour market. Workers, thus, might take up jobs for which they are over-educated
when they enter the labour market. However, they would continue to search for higher
job levels and eventually move up the occupational ladder to positions that match or
even exceed their formal qualifications (see Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000;
Hartog 2000). As argued by Chiswick and Miller (2009), this search and adjustment
process can be particularly relevant for immigrants, especially for those from countries
with labour markets that differ appreciably from those of the destination country. With
residence length and the accumulation of information about the host country labour
market, the incidence of over-education is expected to fall while the incidence of
under-education could rise.
The human capital theory suggests that experience and skills acquired through
on-the-job training could be often substitutes to formal schooling (see Sicherman 1991).
Therefore, individuals may, at the start of their career, accept jobs below their education
level with the intention of accumulating experience and skills for the benefit of an expected
upward job mobility. Similar to the search and matching, the human capital theory predicts
that with job experience over-education decreases, while under-education increases.
One of the few studies that considered the role of job experience accumulated in the
home country in explaining the immigrants’ education mismatch in the host country
labour market is Chiswick and Miller (2009). They found that a greater amount of
home country experience is associated with poorer job matches in the US and argued
the imperfect international transferability of human capital as the main driving force
for that outcome. The authors, however, implicitly assume no education mismatch in
the immigrants’ country of origin labour market. In other words, they suppose that the
professional experience gained prior to immigration was in jobs requiring exactly the
education level obtained from formal schooling.
We, however, diverge from the existing literature and argue that it is not only the
education signal or some other observed characteristic, like race, that determines the
incidence of mismatch, but the actual signal of “real” productivity from the previous
“mismatched” work experience. We expect the level of professional experience at origin
(i.e., below or above the education level) to significantly determine the immigrants’
education mismatch incidence in the host country. For example, immigrants who have
gained professional experience in the home country in jobs below their education level
might be assessed by host country employers as having lower abilities and skills than
those expected from their formal education, since the education signal attenuates with
work experience. That might lead to employment below the education level in the host
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country in a job that required only secondary education and is facing the same out-
come in the host country, then it is less likely that the mismatch is due to imperfect
transferability of skills and more likely due the lower on the jobs skills accumulated
and/or some other unobservable factors (e.g., ability, motivation, ambition, and/or en-
ergy). If, however, the individual was properly matched in the home labour market but
is over-educated in the host country, then perhaps the existing explanations of imper-
fect skill transferability and/or discrimination could be put forward for such an
outcome.
Three broad approaches have been used in the literature to measure the incidence of
under-/over-education. One approach, which is typically based on survey data, uses the
workers’ self assessment about the minimum education level needed for the job they
perform or their understanding of the average education level for a particular job and
whether they possess that or not (e.g., see Sicherman 1991; Dolton and Vignoles 2000). A
second approach, developed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), uses the mean education
level required across a range of occupations. Under this approach an individual is consid-
ered over- or under-educated if his education level is, respectively, one standard deviation
above or below the mean education level required for that particular job. A third way to
analyse the level of over-/under-education is the “objective” measure based on methods
used by different countries/labour organizations to assess the average required education
for a particular job (e.g., Rumberger 1987 and Green et al. 2007). We adopt the last ap-
proach in this paper.
We use the Australian Standard Classification of Occupation (ASCO) codes to divide the
employed immigrants in eight occupational groups: Managers and Administrators;
Professionals; Para-Professionals; Tradespersons; Clerks; Salespersons and Personal Service
Workers; Plant and Machine Operators and Drivers; and Labourers and Related Workers.
For each occupation group Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)
associates a corresponding required level of education 8. Those who have surplus education
to that required by DIAC are considered over-educated, while those who have less are
considered under-educated. The related education levels for each categories and further ex-
planation is provided in section 3 below.3. Data
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) is a panel survey of three
cohorts of immigrants to Australia: LSIA 1 covers migrants who arrived in Australia be-
tween September 1993 and August 1995 and contains three waves, with interviews con-
ducted at 5, 17 and 41 months after arrival; LSIA 2 consists of two waves with interviews
conducted at 5 and 17 months after arrival of immigrants who arrived between September
1999 and August 2000; while LSIA 3 has only one wave and samples immigrants who
arrived in Australia (or were granted their visa onshore) between December 2004 and
March 2005. The substantially smaller number of questions in LSIA 3 relative to LSIA 1
and 2 makes it difficult to carry out the analysis over the three cohorts. Therefore, this
paper uses only data from LSIA 1 and LSIA 2 9.
The LSIA was commissioned in the early 1990s to fulfil the need to have better infor-
mation on the settlement of new migrants than those available through censuses. It is
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cohorts of migrants. LSIA 1 and LSIA 2 contain more than 300 questions about the
settlement process and conditions experienced pre-emigration in the home country
and after relocating to Australia. The LSIA is carried out separately on primary appli-
cants and migrating-unit spouses 10. There are 5,192 primary applicants and 1,838
spouses in Cohort 1, while 3,124 primary applicants and 1,094 spouses were inter-
viewed as part of Cohort 2.
Australian immigration policy became more restrictive for all migrants who entered after
1995 (i.e., Cohort 2 in our paper), except for those in the humanitarian stream 11. The policy
restrictions, intended to favour migrants with skills immediately usable in the labour
market, included higher language proficiency requirements as well as higher weight
attached to other employability factors namely occupational skills, education and age. As a
result, migrants in Cohort 2 have a higher average level of education, higher participation
rates (see Cobb-Clark 2003; Chiswick and Miller 2004), and lower durations to access their
first job (Thapa and Gorgens 2006) than those in Cohort 1, though they appear to have
lower quality initial jobs (Junankar and Mahuteau 2005).
Among the several questions asked in both LSIA 1 and LSIA 2, we capture the
education-occupation mismatch by comparing the level of education acquired by the mi-
grant with the level of education required to perform the migrant’s job as defined by DIAC.
This definition assigns the (formal) educational requirement for managers, administrators
and professionals − who are classified in the ASCO occupational categories 1-3 as “bach-
elor or higher”. For associate professionals, tradespersons, clerks, salespersons and personal
service workers, and plant and machine operators and drivers (ASCO 4-7) the educational
requirement is a “diploma or vocational degree”. For labourers and related workers (ASCO
8-9) it is “secondary or less” education.
We consider as over-educated all those respondents who have a level of education
that is above what is required by DIAC to perform the tasks of the occupation held.
This includes individuals who have a tertiary education but have an occupation that
requires only secondary or vocational education, and individuals who have vocational
education but have an occupation that requires secondary education. Conversely, the
under-educated include individuals who have an education level lower than the one
required for their job.
We consider ASCO for the assessment of the education-occupation mismatch in the
former home country as well. Despite the fact that the countries of origin may have differ-
ent education requirements for specific jobs compared to Australia, we believe that for the
objective of this analysis the Australian employer perspective is of primary importance. An
Australian employer would certainly be less likely to have extensive knowledge about occu-
pation classification standards of other countries. Therefore, he would most likely assess the
former home country labour market experience of immigrants according to the Australian
standards. Moreover, we use very broad occupation and education groups (i.e., three groups
each) generalisation that certainly compensates for most of the differences in education
requirements between countries.
Due to limited number of observations in certain categories (e.g., immigrants that
were over-educated in the home country but are under-educated in Australia), we need
to pool Cohort 1 and 2 in our empirical analysis discussed in section 5. This then limits
us to use only the first two waves of Cohort 1 as Cohort 2 does not have a third wave.
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appear as participating in the labour market in the LSIA.
From Table 1, it can be seen that male immigrants are typically in their mid-30’s, have a
small family, with one or two dependent children. The majority is highly educated, with ap-
proximately two thirds holding a diploma/certificate or higher educational qualification.
The main countries of former residence are English speaking OECD countries (i.e., Canada,
Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; above 20 percent for both cohorts) and
South, East, South East Asia and Oceania (between 36 and 41 percent).
Table 2 presents the education mismatch transitions between the occupational status
in the job held in the home country during the last 12 months before migration and
the occupational status at five months after arrival in Australia. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
many of those who had a job in the home country prior to migration were unemployed
in the first months after migrating to Australia. On average 31 percent of immigrants
were unemployed at five months after arrival, with the highest incidence of unemploy-
ment among those who were unemployed or not in the labour force at home (about 47
percent). The overall incidence of unemployment drops at 17 months after arrival to
about 20 percent, and is even less for those who held a job matched with their formal
educational qualifications at home (about 15 percent; see Table 3). There is also sub-
stantial persistence in the educational mismatch between home and host countries
among those who were employed both prior and after migration: 41 percent of the
over-educated at home were over-educated in their job in Australia at five months after
arrival; the rate increases to about 51 percent at 17 months after arrival, as part of
those who were initially unemployed enter into employment. This path dependency
can be observed with respect to under-education as well: of those who were under-
educated at home, about 46 percent were under-educated at five months and 47 per-
cent at 17 months after immigration to Australia.
Table 4 illustrates that the educational mismatch persistence remains during the
period analysed (17 months after arrival). Over 61 percent of those over-educated in
the initial jobs at arrival continued to work in positions that required a lower level of
formal education even after 17 months of residence, and about 79 percent of those
who were initially under-educated remained in jobs that required a higher level of for-
mal education.4. Empirical methods
The primary concern of this paper is to model the determinants of a mismatch between
the actual education and the one formally required for the occupation (i.e., over-
education and under-education respectively) among immigrants in the Australian
labour market. Given the fact that the mismatch is observed only for the employed
individuals, an exclusive focus on those immigrants who have an occupation may over-
look the fact that they might constitute a non-randomly selected sub-sample (see, for
instance, Dolton and Vignoles 2000). Bauer (2002) and Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006)
argue that the presence of possible heterogeneity of ability in the population could have
a significant impact on the labour market outcome and consequently the extent of
over- and under-education in the employed subsample. Given Australia’s different visa
regimes which range from high skilled immigrants to refugees and those who entered
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics – male immigrants aged 21 to 64
Cohort 1 Cohort 2
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2
Age 34.25 35.11 35.27 36.42
No. of adults in household 2.81 2.43 2.60 2.36
No. of children in household 1.55 1.48 1.56 1.49
Education: Postgraduate 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.27
Education: Bachelor 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.21
Education: Diploma/Certificate 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Education: Completed secondary or trade 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24
Education: Some secondary or less 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07
FHC: English Speaking OECD 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.22
FHC: Non-English Speaking OECD 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13
FHC: South, East, South East Asia & Oceania 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.40
FHC: Sub-Saharan Africa 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
FHC: Other 0.23 0.26 0.14 0.15
Qualification assessed 0.33 0.39 0.30 0.30
Self-employment 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.17
Interview in English 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.87
Visited Australia before immigration 0.48 0.45 0.65 0.62
Visa type: Preferential Family/Family Stream 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.33
Visa type: Concessional Family/Skilled-Austr. Link 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15
Visa type: Business Skills & Empl. Nom. Scheme 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.22
Visa type: Independent 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.20
Visa type: Humanitarian 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.09
HH owns car 0.71 0.85 0.67 0.83
Occup in AU: Managers & Administrators 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15
Occup in AU: Professionals 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.32
Occup in AU: Para-Professionals 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.13
Occup in AU: Tradespersons 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.16
Occup in AU: Clerks 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Occup in AU: Salespersons & Pers. Serv. Workers 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09
Occup in AU: Plant & Machine Operators & Drivers 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08
Occup in AU: Labourers & Related Workers 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.05
Educ. mismatch AU: Unemployed 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.11
Educ. mismatch AU: Over-educated 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.16
Educ. mismatch AU: Correctly matched 0.39 0.50 0.51 0.52
Educ. mismatch AU: Under-educated 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.21
Educ. mismatch FHC: Not working 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12
Educ. mismatch FHC: Over-educated 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
Educ. mismatch FHC: Correctly matched 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.57
Educ. mismatch FHC: Under-educated 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23
Region of residence: New South Wales 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.36
Region of residence: Victoria 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24
Region of residence: Queensland 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11
Region of residence: South Australia 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics – male immigrants aged 21 to 64 (Continued)
Region of residence: Western Australia 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15
Region of residence: Tasmania 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Region of residence: Northern Territory 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Region of residence: A.C.T. 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
No. of observations 2,127 2,011 921 907
Note: FHC stands for “Formal Home Country”.
Piracha et al. IZA Journal of Migration 2012, 1:3 Page 9 of 21
http://www.izajom.com/content/1/1/3on family visa, the immigrant sample is likely to be quite heterogeneous in ability and
home country experiences.
Only about 68.6 percent of male immigrants in the potential labour force had em-
ployment at five months after immigration and 80.5 percent one year later. Taking into
consideration the fact that the two possible types of mismatch (i.e., over-education and
under-education) are observed only if the individual is employed, we apply a binomial
probit model in order to correct for eventual sample selection bias. This approach fol-
lows Green et al. (2007), who use the same database and identification variables.
The occurrence of the mismatch j – which stands for either over- or under-
education – may be illustrated by the following two linear latent dependent variable
equations:
y∗1 ij ¼ x
0
i βþ ui ð1Þ
where y1ij ¼ 1if the individual has attained the respective mismatch y∗1ij > 0
 
and




i γ þ vi ð2Þ
where y2i ¼ 1 if the individual is employed y∗2i > 0
 
and y2i ¼ 0 if not y∗2i≤0
 
:
The dichotomous variable y1ij is only observed if y2i ¼ 1. The model was first pre-
sented by Van De Ven and Van Praag (1981) to examine deductibles in private health
insurance in the Netherlands. Variants of the model have then been used, for example,
by Boyes et al. (1989) for analysing the default on loans while taking into account
whether an application for a loan was accepted or not and Litchfield and Reilly (2009)Table 2 Transition matrix of education mismatch between home country and 5 months
after arrival in Australia (Cohort 1&2)
Education mismatch
in home country
Education mismatch in Australia – 5 months after arrival
Unemployed Over-educated Correctly matched Under-educated Total
Not working 46.81 12.77 28.37 12.06 100
Over-educated 39.11 41.13 19.35 0.40 100
Correctly matched 26.50 11.98 59.21 2.31 100
Under-educated 33.96 2.80 16.98 46.26 100
Total 31.35 12.53 42.99 13.13 100
Note: The “Not working” subgroup in the case of “education-occupation mismatch in the home country” includes besides
unemployed also individuals that were not in the labour force, since some of them are employed or are looking for a job
once in Australia.
Table 3 Transition matrix of education mismatch between home country and 17 months
after arrival in Australia (Cohort 1&2)
Education mismatch
in home country
Education mismatch in Australia – 17 months after arrival
Unemployed Over-educated Correctly matched Under-educated Total
Not working 37.45 14.74 31.87 15.94 100
Over-educated 20.62 50.52 28.35 0.52 100
Correctly matched 14.83 18.15 63.47 3.54 100
Under-educated 22.30 3.60 26.76 47.34 100
Total 19.51 16.87 48.30 15.32 100
Note: The “Not working” subgroup in the case of “education-occupation mismatch in the home country” includes besides
unemployed also individuals that were not in the labour force, since some of them are employed or are looking for a job
once in Australia.
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considered migrating.
Equation (2) is fully observed and can be estimated separately. However, separate estima-
tion of mismatch attainment (Eqn. 1) may be subject to selection bias given the potential
for correlation between the two error terms ui and vi. The model can be estimated stepwise
(i.e., the inverse Mill’s ratio of the selection equation is introduced as a covariate in the out-
come probit equation) or by maximum likelihood. Relative to the maximum likelihood ap-
proach, the two-step method is often perceived to give inconsistent results, in particular in
the case when there is strong multicollinearity between covariates in the outcome and the
selection equations (e.g., when using a joint set of covariates; see Lahiri and Song 2000).







































ð3ÞTable 4 Transition matrix of education mismatch between 5 and 17 months after arrival
in Australia (Cohort 1&2)
Education mismatch
in Australia – 5 months
after arrival
Education mismatch in Australia – 17 months after arrival
Unemployed Over-educated Correctly matched Under-educated Total
Not working 39.33 17.52 30.57 12.57 100
Over-educated 6.11 61.45 30.15 2.29 100
Correctly matched 3.02 6.52 86.11 4.35 100
Under-educated 4.53 1.23 15.64 78.60 100
Total 19.51 16.87 48.30 15.32 100
Note: The “Not working” subgroup in the case of “education-occupation mismatch in Australia at 5 months after arrival”
includes besides unemployed also individuals that are were initially not in the labour force, since some of them are
employed or are looking for a job one year later.
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denotes the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function; and Φ ð Þ the
univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. The parameters of Eqns.
(1) and (2) are estimated jointly by maximizing the log-likelihood function (3) with re-
spect to the coefficient vectors β and γ and the correlation coefficient ρ. The estimate
of ρ provides a test for selectivity bias. If ρ is significantly different from zero, the coef-
ficients of Eqn. (1) would have been biased if estimated separately by binomial probit.
The identification of such selectivity models is of crucial importance. Identification is
achieved by the inclusion of variables in Eqn. (2) that are excluded from Eqn. (1). Poor
identification restrictions can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the presence of se-
lectivity effects. In the context of our application it would be of some interest to establish
if, having controlled for a set of observable characteristics, the employed respondents pos-
sessed unobservable characteristics (e.g., motivation, cognitive abilities, etc.) that were in
some way different from the whole sample. A statistically significant ρ value may provide
an insight into this particular issue. However, confidence in the reliability of such a result
depends crucially on appropriate identification. There is a set of variables that appear in z
0
i
but not in x
0
i as well as a set that is common to both vectors. In addition, there are variables
that appear in x
0
i but not in z
0
i, though these are not crucial for identification.
Following the empirical study of Green et al. (2007) the covariates chosen to identify
the model (i.e., variables appear in z
0
i but not x
0
i ) are: car ownership, the household
structure, a control for whether the immigrant visited Australia prior to immigration, a
variable indicating whether the immigrant had own funds at the time of arrival and
English proficiency.There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for these identify-
ing restrictions. As shown in previous studies, owning a motor vehicle might increase
the area where the individual can take up a job and, thus, the employment opportun-
ities (see Raphael and Stoll, 2000; Green et al., 2007). Theoretically, however, there is
no relation between car ownership and labour market experience and/or abilities.
Education-occupation mismatch shall, therefore, not be dependent on car ownership.
The family structure may affect the probability of employment as well. For instance, the
presence of other adults in the household might ease the pressure of taking up employ-
ment. On the other side, immigrant men with dependent children (i.e., at or below school
age) present might be under greater pressure of taking up employment (see Lundberg and
Rose, 2002). Moreover, Green et al. (2007) argue that immigrants who have visited Australia
prior to settlement are likely to have better knowledge of the Australian labour market or
have already established contacts with Australian employers. Hence, we control for both the
effect of the number of adults, the number of dependent children in the household and the
knowledge of the Australian labour market through prior visits on the probability of being
in employment. None of these variables should be correlated with labour market experience
and/or abilities and, hence, education-occupation mismatch.
Two more identification instruments used by Green et al. (2007) are a control for
having funds at the time of arrival and English language proficiency. They suggest that
immigrants who face liquidity constraints might also be more likely to be under pres-
sure to take up employment and the proficiency level of the host country language may
have a positive effect on the probability of employment. Nevertheless, both savings and
language proficiency could be correlated to innate abilities and, thus to education-
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gested by Murray (2006): the selection instruments are introduced as covariates in both




i); the rejection of the null
hypothesis that these additional instruments all have zero coefficients in the outcome
equation (Eqn. 1) would support their validity as instruments.
The test results show that for both cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and,
therefore, the instruments are valid. However, contrarily to Green et al. (2007), we find
that the dummy controlling for having funds at time of immigration is not significant
in the selection equation and is, hence, a weak instrument. For simplicity and given the
fact that we have five valid instruments, we will not include the control for having
funds at arrival in the estimation.
Our primary covariates of interest are a set of dummy variables included only in the
outcome equation and control for the type of mismatch between the educational level
and the occupational attainment in the last job held in the former home country in the
12 months prior to immigration (i.e., over-educated, correct match, under-educated).
Having not worked during the last 12 months prior to immigration is the reference
group for the dummy set. Moreover, immigrants enter Australia with formal experience
gained from a large variety of labour markets. In order to capture differences in “qual-
ity” of previous labour market experience, we include in a second specification of our
empirical model controls for the former home country as well.5. Empirical results
We start the analysis by assessing the importance of our variables of interest in improv-
ing the explanatory power of the empirical model. In this first step – making abstrac-
tion of the eventual sample selection bias – we compare the adjusted R-squared from a
binomial probit estimation of Eqn. (1), with and without including the set of dummies
for the type of mismatch between the education level and the occupational attainment
in the last job held in the home country twelve months prior to immigration.
The results show that the education-occupation mismatch incidence in the home country
adds significantly to the explanation of the variation in the immigrants’ mismatch in Austra-
lia (see Figure 1). Compared to a model that has as covariates only socio-economic controls
used in pervious studies (i.e., age, age squared, a dummy for having the qualification
assessed in Australia, dummies for the former region of residence, dummies for the entry
visa type, a dummy for school age children present, a dummy for having financial funds at
time of entry, and regional dummies), the inclusion of covariates controlling for the mis-
match in the home country almost doubles the explanatory power of the probit estimation
for over-education at five months after arrival in Australia (i.e., adjusted R-square increases
from 0.13 to 0.27) and almost quadruples the explanatory power of probit estimation for
under-education at five months after arrival (i.e., adjusted R-squared increase from 0.14 to
0.50 percent).
The estimation results of the probit models with sample selection, for over- and under-
education at five and 17 months after arrival, respectively, are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
Both the selection into employment and the education mismatch equations include controls
















Cohort 1&2, Wave 1 (5
months)
Cohort 1&2, Wave 2 (17
months)
Cohort 1&2, Wave 1 (5
months)
Cohort 1&2, Wave 2 (17
months)




characteristics + mismatch in home country
Figure 1 Pseudo R-squared values from probit estimations of over- and under-education of
employed male immigrants in Australia. Notes: “Socio-economic characteristics” include: age, age
squared, a dummy for having the qualification assessed in Australia, a dummy for being self-employed,
dummies for the former country of residence, dummies for the entry visa type, a dummy for school age
children present, a dummy for having financial funds at time of entry, and regional dummies. “Mismatch
in home country” includes three dummy variables: “not working”, “over-educated”, and “under-
educated”, with “correctly matched” being the base group.
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tively related to host country language proficiency, knowledge of the Australian labour
market over previous country visits, having obtained the entry visa after screening for
labour market and/or business skills, having a car, and having dependent children in the
household (see Green et al., 2007). The probability of being employed is negatively affected
by having entered Australia on a humanitarian visa, which could be evidence of having
relatively lower skill level, and the presence of other adults in the household that might
contribute to the household income. Moreover, at five months after arrival, immigrants in
Cohort 2 are about 14 percent more likely to be in employment compared to immigrants
in Cohort 1, probably due to the stricter access to unemployment benefits introduced in
1996.
The error term of the selection equation is positively correlated with the error term of the
over-education equation, indicating that there are unobservable factors that affect similarly
the likelihood of both employment and over-education. One explanation could be that rela-
tively “low-level” jobs are accepted to avoid the stigma of being unemployed, or perhaps
there are other financial/family pressures to accept “any” job at the start of the immigration
process, with the aim to improve in terms of occupational mobility, as opportunities
improve with time spent in Australia.
Australian employers seem to take into consideration signals about the immigrants’
labour market abilities from the education mismatch incidence in the last job in the home
country. At five months after immigration and conditional on being employed, immigrants
who have been over-educated in the job held in the home country 12 months prior to im-
migration have about 45 to 48 percent higher likelihood to be over-educated in Australia.
Similarly, having been under-educated in the last job in the home country increases the
Table 5 Probit with sample selection estimates of over- and under-education (marginal
effects) – Cohort 1&2, Wave 1 (5 months after arrival)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-education Under-education
Age 0.021 0.006 0.001 -0.001
[0.008] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006]
Age squared x 100 -0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.001
[0.011] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
Qualification assessed 0.022 0.025 -0.069 -0.070
[0.019] [0.020] [0.016]*** [0.015]***
Self-Employed -0.070 -0.077 0.144 0.155
[0.021]*** [0.023]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]***
FHC: Non-English Speaking OECD 0.019 -0.025
[0.032] [0.017]
FHC: South, East, South East Asia and Oceania 0.133 -0.055
[0.029]*** [0.015]***
FHC: Sub-Saharan Africa 0.092 -0.003
[0.047]* [0.024]
FHC: Other 0.135 -0.027
[0.041]*** [0.020]
Visa type: Concessional Family/Skilled-Austr. Link 0.012 -0.008 -0.002 0.005
[0.022] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022]
Visa type: Business Skills & Empl. Nomination Scheme -0.163 -0.171 0.009 0.006
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.020] [0.019]
Visa type: Independent -0.055 -0.075 -0.035 -0.030
[0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.019]* [0.018]*
Visa type: Humanitarian -0.013 -0.011 -0.032 -0.034
[0.044] [0.049] [0.026] [0.025]
Educ. mismatch FHC: not working 0.009 -0.002 0.287 0.305
[0.026] [0.027] [0.046]*** [0.048]***
Educ. mismatch FHC: over-educated 0.453 0.477 -0.077 -0.072
[0.048]*** [0.046]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]***
Educ. mismatch FHC: under-educated -0.138 -0.151 0.617 0.617
[0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]***
Cohort 2 -0.030 -0.039 0.018 0.018
[0.015]** [0.016]** [0.015] [0.015]
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection equation (Probability of being employed)
Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Age squared x 100 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Interview in English 0.065 0.068 0.071 0.071
[0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]***
Visited Australia before immigration 0.090 0.083 0.082 0.082
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Table 5 Probit with sample selection estimates of over- and under-education (marginal
effects) – Cohort 1&2, Wave 1 (5 months after arrival) (Continued)
[0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***
Visa type: Concessional Family/Skilled-Austr. Link 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074
[0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]***
Visa type: Business Skills & Empl. Nomination Scheme 0.334 0.335 0.335 0.335
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]***
Visa type: Independent 0.082 0.081 0.080 0.080
[0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]***
Visa type: Humanitarian -0.305 -0.310 -0.312 -0.312
[0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.041]***
Number of adults in household -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]***
Children present 0.051 0.055 0.061 0.060
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]***
HH owns car 0.151 0.148 0.144 0.144
[0.022]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]*** [0.023]***
Cohort 2 0.144 0.143 0.142 0.142
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]***
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3048 3048 3048 3048
Censored obs 962 962 962 962
Wald chi2 282.40 297.03 656.87 654.29
Log likelihood -2138.46 -2120.38 -1915.63 -1909.17
ρ 0.803 0.381 -0.105 -0.049
[0.312]** [0.326] [0.149] [0.152]
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The base group for “Formal Home Country” (FHC) is “English speaking OECD”; for “Visa type” the base group is
“Preferential Family/ Family Stream”; and for “Education mismatch FHC” the base group is “Correctly matched”.
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ference between the sizes of the two effects could be explained by the fact that the immi-
grant population is likely to be non-randomly selected from the home countries’
populations. Assuming that immigrants are positively selected with respect to unobserved
abilities and motivation, they would be expected to put more effort in climbing up the oc-
cupational ladder (see Chiswick 1978). Therefore, the best from the under-educated group
in the home country are likely to have a higher probability to be under-educated in Austra-
lia and the best of the over-educated in the home market are likely to have a lower prob-
ability to be over-educated in Australia. The effect of that would be lower observed
coefficients between over-education at origin and over-education in Australia and greater
observed coefficients between under-education at origin and in Australia compared to the
ones that would be obtained in the absence of selection bias. Nevertheless, we cannot cor-
rect for this due to the lack of information about the socio-economic characteristics of the
home countries’ populations.
Table 6 Probit with sample selection estimates of over- and under-education (marginal
effects) – Cohort 1&2, Wave 2 (17 months after arrival)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-education Under-education
Age -0.002 0.003 0.006 0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Age squared x 100 0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008]
Qualification assessed 0.026 0.030 -0.078 -0.099
[0.016] [0.017]* [0.015]*** [0.017]***
Self-Employed -0.059 -0.055 0.118 0.092
[0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]***
FHC: Non-English Speaking OECD 0.029 0.017 -0.014 0.021
[0.029] [0.028] [0.020] [0.028]
FHC: South, East, South East Asia and Oceania 0.085 0.002 -0.060 -0.001
[0.023]*** [0.021] [0.016]*** [0.022]
FHC: Sub-Saharan Africa -0.003 -0.041 0.004 0.099
[0.033] [0.026] [0.026] [0.042]**
FHC: Other 0.107 0.021 -0.036 -0.010
[0.029]*** [0.025] [0.019]* [0.025]
Visa type: Concessional Family/Skilled-Austr. Link -0.006 0.026 0.012 -0.028
[0.020] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021]
Visa type: Business Skills & Empl. Nomination Scheme -0.147 -0.076 0.008 0.001
[0.014]*** [0.021]*** [0.020] [0.024]
Visa type: Independent -0.079 -0.033 -0.046 -0.072
[0.016]*** [0.019]* [0.018]** [0.019]***
Visa type: Humanitarian -0.036 -0.043 -0.030 -0.021
[0.022] [0.021]** [0.021] [0.025]
Educ. mismatch FHC: not working -0.042 0.338
[0.019]** [0.045]***
Educ. mismatch FHC: over-educated 0.334 -0.073
[0.044]*** [0.021]***
Educ. mismatch FHC: under-educated -0.154 0.565
[0.012]*** [0.027]***
Educ. mismatch Wave 1: not working 0.210 0.221
[0.023]*** [0.025]***
Educ. mismatch Wave 1: over-educated 0.657 -0.020
[0.036]*** [0.031]
Educ. mismatch Wave 1: under-educated -0.071 0.824
[0.024]*** [0.022]***
Cohort 2 -0.011 0.014 0.062 0.045
[0.014] [0.015] [0.016]*** [0.017]***
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selection equation (Probability of being employed)
Age 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.012
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Table 6 Probit with sample selection estimates of over- and under-education (marginal
effects) – Cohort 1&2, Wave 2 (17 months after arrival) (Continued)
[0.005]* [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Age squared x 100 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]***
Interview in English 0.062 0.065 0.083 0.087
[0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.019]*** [0.020]***
Visited Australia before immigration 0.084 0.078 0.081 0.082
[0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Visa type: Concessional Family/Skilled-Austr. Link 0.034 0.030 0.026 0.026
[0.015]** [0.015]** [0.016]* [0.016]*
Visa type: Business Skills & Empl. Nomination Scheme 0.139 0.138 0.137 0.136
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]***
Visa type: Independent 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.044
[0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Visa type: Humanitarian -0.170 -0.173 -0.165 -0.162
[0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]***
Number of adults in household -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Children present 0.043 0.046 0.056 0.056
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
HH owns car 0.118 0.117 0.124 0.122
[0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]***
Cohort 2 0.067 0.065 0.060 0.059
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2918 2918 2918 2918
Censored obs 497 497 497 497
Wald chi2 312.76 490.38 691.76 719.04
Log likelihood -1907.95 -1783.69 -1654.33 -1601.07
ρ 1.899 1.446 -0.002 0.258
[1.165] [0.630]** [0.174] [0.212]
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The base group for “Formal Home Country” (FHC) is “English speaking OECD”; for “Visa type” the base group is
“Preferential Family/ Family Stream”; and for “Education mismatch FHC” the base group is “Correctly matched”.
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East, South East Asia and Oceania as well as from countries in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Compared
to having lived and worked in Canada, Ireland, the UK or the US, immigrants from Asia
(South, East and South East) and Oceania had about 13.3 percent higher probability of
being over-educated at five months after arrival, whereas having migrated from Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, or Central and South America
increased the over-education probability by about 13.5 percent.
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required the proof of business or professional skills significantly decreases the like-
lihood of over-education: compared to a Preferential Family Visa, our reference
category, having immigrated with a Business Skills Visa or through the Employer
Nomination Scheme decreases the probability of being over-educated by about 16
to 17 percent, while having entered with an Independent Skilled Visa decreases it
by about 5.5 to 7.5 percent.
Having an overseas qualification assessed in Australia does not seem to improve the
education-occupation match, at least not in the first three years after arrival. Even after
17 months of arrival, the assessment of a foreign qualification is more common among
those immigrants that fail to find a job in which they can fully use their qualifications:
having the qualification assessed is positively related to working below the formal edu-
cation level and negatively related to working above it.
The comparison of home country mismatch effect at 5 and 17 months after arrival
(Tables 5 and 6 respectively) shows that it becomes weaker with the length of residence
in Australia 13. The relation of over-education in Australia to over-education in the
home country decreases from about 48 percent at five months to about 33 percent at
17 months after immigration, while the effect of under-education in the home country
on under-education in Australia decreases from 62 to 56 percent. This is consistent
with the argument that a more recent signal about the real productivity/ability, after
starting work in Australia, has a much stronger effect on over-education incidence (at
17 months after arrival; marginal effect of 0.66) compared to the signal from over-
education in the home country (marginal effect of 0.33). Similarly, the probability of
being under-educated at 17 months after immigration is about 82 percent higher if the
immigrant was under-educated at five months after landing, but only 56 percent higher
if it was under-educated in the home country.
At 17 months after arrival, the probability of being employed of Cohort 2 vs. Cohort
1 immigrants drops from 14 percent to about 6 percent, depending on the type of mis-
match. However, Cohort 2 immigrants become approximately 5 to 6 percent more
likely to be under-educated, providing evidence of an eventual better selection with re-
gard to unobservable skills after the 1996 reform in Australia’s immigration policy.6. Conclusions
The main objective of the paper was to investigate the role of a possible mismatch
of an immigrant in the home country on his subsequent mismatch in the host
country. Many immigrants appear to have work experience before migration in
jobs below (or above) their education level, which might generate a negative (or
positive) effect on their average skill level. Therefore, taking into account the level
of professional experience achieved before migration, along with the formal educa-
tion qualifications, provides a more accurate estimate of the immigrants’ real prod-
uctivity, especially since the education signal attenuates with work experience.
We used the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia for two cohorts of
immigrants who entered the country in 1993-1995 and 1999/2000 respectively and
showed that the inclusion of covariates capturing the mismatch already experienced
in the home country almost doubles the explanatory power of probit models
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power of the models assessing the under-education of immigrants.
After controlling for selection into employment and the effect of various socio-
economic characteristics, over- and under-education in the home country continue
to have the strongest effect among all covariates: having been over-educated in the
last job held in the home country increases the likelihood of over-education at five
months after arrival in Australia by about 45 percent, while having been under-
educated at home increases the probability of under-education in Australia by
about 61 percent. The importance of “ability signals” in path dependency in over-/
under-education is also confirmed by the fact that the education-occupation mis-
match after 17 months of residence is significantly dependent on the education-
occupation mismatch experiences immediately after arrival in Australia.
The more stringent rules on access to social security payments faced by the second im-
migrant cohort increased their employment probability relative to the first cohort. How-
ever in contradiction to Green et al. (2007), we found no evidence that the constraint of
finding a job sooner has resulted in a poorer matching incidence for the second cohort;
this being probably the effect of the tighter selection criteria with respect to skills under
the points-based system.Endnotes
1 There are a number of other authors who have shown similar results (see for instance,
McGuinness 2006; Mavromara et al, 2009 and McGuinness and Sloane 2011).
2 See McGuiness (2003) and McGuiness and Wooden (2009).
3 See for instance, McGuinness and Sloane (2011), Chevalier and Lindley (2009),
McGuinness (2006), Voon and Miller (2005), Battu and Sloane (2004), Gottschalk and
Hansen (2003), Bauer (2002), Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Hartog (2000) and McGoldrick
and Robst (1996).
4 Recent work suggests that more than 50 percent of a country’s employed are not
correctly matched (see Leuven and Oostorbeek 2011).
5 It has become a stylised fact now that over-educated employees earn less than
those with the required education level. This conclusion of course rests on the as-
sumption that the returns to human capital are mostly affected by formal educa-
tion rather than training and learning on the job (e.g., Ben-Porath 1967; Heckman
1976; and Mincer 1997) or career interruptions or switches (e.g., Mincer and Ofek
1982).
6 See a recent survey of literature on migrants’ overeducation by Piracha and Vadean
(2012).
7 Possible discrimination against immigrants in the US is also suggested by Chiswick
and Miller (2010).
8 See http://www.immi.gov.au/employers/_pdf/ansco-anzsco-differences.pdf.
9 Migrants interviewed in LSIA 1 will be referred to as Cohort 1 and those in LSIA 2
will be referred to as Cohort 2 in the rest of the paper.
10 Migrating unit is this context includes all members of the family migrating to
Australia under the same visa application. The term spouse is used for husband/
wife, civil partners, fiancé(e)s and de facto partners.
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Employer Nominated, Preferential Family, Concessional Family and Refugee. See Green
et al. (2007) for a discussion.
12 Due to the very small sub-samples of immigrants in the Australian Capital Territory
(ACT), Tasmania and Northern Australia, we merged these with New South Wales, South
Australia and Western Australia respectively. The pairing was made on the basis of geo-
graphical proximity as well as labour market similarities in terms of average unemployment
rates and average weekly earnings of employees. Hence, our five regional dummies are:
‘New South Wales & ACT’, ‘Victoria’, ‘Queensland’, ‘South Australia & Tasmania’, and ‘Northern
& Western Australia’.
13 Only immigrants of Cohort 1 were interviewed also at 41 months after arrival, the
longest period in the data. However, the maximum likelihood estimations of the probit
model with sample selection failed to reach a maximum for most settings using Cohort 1
separately, due to the limited number of observations in certain sub-categories. In settings
for which the estimations reached a maximum, we encountered the problem of very high
standard errors. We therefore do not present here the results, but they are available from
the authors upon request.Competing interests
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